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Is it Time to Re-think the WTO? 
A Return to the Basics
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Senior Associate, The Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade
The GATT was an organization that was seldom at the centre of political controversy, nor
was it the object of virulent protest. The WTO, which succeeded it, however, has not
enjoyed the GATT’s anonymity. The controversies surrounding the WTO detract from its
effectiveness and debase its credibility. In large measure, the contentious issues that the
WTO has been attempting to deal with since its inception do not have at their heart trade in
goods and services. The framers of the WTO took bold steps to create a new institution dur-
ing the Uruguay Round—much of which has turned out to be a significant improvement on
the GATT. This does not mean, however, that everything that was put in place has proved
to be an improvement, or even workable. It may be time to consider returning the WTO to
its basic function—providing a set of rules for the conduct of trade in goods and services.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
I
t is often forgotten in the midst of the nationalist or anti-nationalist rhetoric in media
coverage of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that it is firms that engage in inter-
national commercial transactions—countries do not engage in trade.1 International trade is
simply the aggregation of the fruits of those transactions on a national basis. Trade is the
result of a firm in one country identifying a business opportunity in another country and
then organizing a commercial transaction to act on that opportunity. If a firm in London
Vol um e  1   N um be r  2 , 2 00 0/   p. 9 9 - 1 0 7 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o msees a commercial opportunity to sell its goods to a firm in Manchester, no one pays any
attention. If that same London firm finds a similar opportunity to sell an identical good to
a company based in New York, all manner of groups—not the least of whom are politi-
cians—feel they have a duty, and a right, to comment on and otherwise become involved
in the transaction.
Governments strongly guard the right to tax, limit, and in other ways regulate interna-
tional transactions in ways that differ from their interventions in domestic commerce. One
of the reasons for this is that they have no authority to monitor production and commercial
practices in foreign countries. An equally important reason, however, is the ability to
extend protection from foreign competitors to domestic petitioners. While most politicians
believe that open international markets are generally beneficial, they do not believe this is
true in all circumstances, and they certainly understand that politically important con-
stituents may be harmed by international competition. Ideally, politicians would like the
flexibility to extend protection easily to their constituents when it is politically expedient.
For firms wishing to engage in international commerce, however, the unconstrained
and arbitrary ability of governments to impose restrictions on their transactions represents
a considerable risk. Transactions, and, more important, investments made in support of
anticipated transactions, are based on calculations of expected profitability. Once a foreign
transaction is entered into or an investment is made to support future foreign activities,
having the commercial conditions upon which those decisions were arrived at altered by
an arbitrary change in trade policy by foreign governments can lead to considerable finan-
cial losses. Under these conditions, international transactions are shunned and investments
inhibited. As a result, the potential benefits from international trade forgone exceed by
large orders of magnitude the losses suffered by those who may be directly affected by the
imposition of trade barriers in specific markets.
Firms that wish to engage in international commerce desire strong and transparent
rules that constrain the ability of governments to impose trade barriers. The framers of the
New World Order at the end of the Second World War had lived through the beggar thy
neighbour trade wars of the Great Depression of the 1930s and had seen first hand the
effects of virtually unconstrained and arbitrary protectionism (Kerr, 2000). They decided
that a new international institution was required to facilitate the establishment of interna-
tional rules for government intervention in international commercial activities. While a
comprehensive International Trade Organization (ITO) was negotiated as part of the broad
process that created the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, it did not come into being, largely because U.S. congressional politicians would not
accept  the  degree  of  discipline  on  their  protectionist  prerogatives  that  the  U.S.
Administration had conceded in the negotiations (Hart, 1998). One of the ITO’s subagree-
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mier international organization for negotiating and administering rules for trade. The
GATT was exclusively concerned with trade in goods and had a primary focus on border
measures and their reduction. Only in the penultimate Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations
that ended in 1979 was there a concerted effort to expand the role of the organization
beyond its traditional concerns.
At any point in time, the GATT represented the current state of the international com-
promise between the desire of politicians to provide security for firms that wished to
engage in international commerce and their need for flexibility in the ability to extend pro-
tection to domestic constituents. The GATT principle of accepted retaliation has always
provided domestic politicians with the ability to ignore GATT disciplines when the domes-
tic political pressure to extend protection became too great—but not without a cost (Kerr
and Perdikis, 1995). In fact, the entire history of the GATT can be viewed as a long process
of raising the cost of extending protection by both increasing the scope of activities to
which GATT disciplines applied and by tightening up the existing disciplines. The objec-
tive was to provide firms wishing to engage in international commerce with increased sure-
ty for their investments.
Changing Realities
O
ver the fifty-odd years of its existence, the GATT organization was successful in low-
ering the major barrier to international trade that existed when it came into being—
tariffs. The reduction in tariffs contributed to the growth in international trade, and the
increased surety for investments in international commerce provided a spur to research and
development in international transport technology and packaging and in new transaction-
cost–reducing financial and insurance instruments. In addition, international commerce
benefited disproportionately from the revolution in computer and electronic information
transfer technology that has been manifest since the mid-1980s. The combined result of
these changes is the trend toward what has been termed globalization.
The GATT, however, seemed increasingly incapable of dealing with the challenges
provided by globalization. In particular, its mandate was restricted to trade in goods while
the fastest growing sector of most economies was services. The reduction of tariffs had
exposed a multitude of domestic regulations that acted to restrict trade. The consensus-
based dispute settlement system had been designed for an organization constituted as a
forty-odd member club 
inhabited by diplomats of impeccable reputation who would ensure that its
affairs would be conducted with all seemly propriety. Should any unhappy dif-
ferences arise they would be settled privately according to the feelings of the
general consensus (Journal of World Trade Law, 1981, 469).
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grown to 120-plus members encompassing a wide range of political and economic philoso-
phies.
The Uruguay Round (1986-1993) set about to rectify this situation. Services were now
encompassed through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), stronger dis-
ciplines on non-tariff barriers and subsidies were hammered out, and a new dispute settle-
ment mechanism was established based on an arbitration model that did not require con-
sensus. All of this should have provided greater surety for firms wishing to engage in inter-
national commerce.
Trade Sanctions as a Weapon in International Relations
T
rade barriers can be used for purely economic reasons—to reduce the competitiveness
of imported products. The GATT was primarily an organization that made rules
regarding the use of trade barriers for protectionist motives. Trade barriers can, however,
also be viewed as a means of achieving other goals—to sanction foreign governments for
activities that are considered unacceptable by the party imposing the trade barrier (Kerr and
Gaisford, 1994). Trade barriers impose costs on the economy of the country judged to be
following unacceptable practices. It is hoped by the imposing country that these costs will
be sufficient inducement for the offending country to alter its practices. The most obvious
examples of the use of trade sanctions for political reasons are their imposition by the inter-
national community on countries such as Iraq after the Gulf War, Serbia after the break-up
of Yugoslavia, and apartheid-era South Africa. The United States has applied trade sanc-
tions against Cuba for decades. Thus, trade barriers represent the middle ground along the
continuum of international inducements that can be used by governments when they
attempt to influence the activities of other governments. At one end of the continuum is
diplomatic pressure and at the other is military force.
Diplomatic sanctions are not likely to alter the practices of a determined adversary.
War carries high costs, potentially in human lives and certainly in mounting a foreign cam-
paign and in material losses for the country attacked. War is also politically risky. Trade
sanctions can impose real costs but, for the most part, carry low political risk.2 The poten-
tial to use trade sanctions as a way to threaten countries into changing their practices has
not been lost on groups in society with vested economic interests or who have strongly held
preferences. One example of the latter is environmental activists. Environmental groups
have been successful in the United States in getting trade sanctions embedded into domes-
tic environmental regulations pertaining to the protection of marine mammals and other
aquatic species. For example, countries which do not comply with the International
Whaling Commission are threatened with U.S. trade sanctions, as are those who by U.S.
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threaten turtles, etc. Unilaterally, the United States has had considerable success in threat-
ening countries into altering their high seas resource management practices (Gordon et al.,
2000).
Environmental groups have been particularly frustrated by what they perceive as the
ineffectiveness of using international diplomacy to police poor environmental manage-
ment. Collectively, they have put tremendous efforts into the process of reaching
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) such as the Rio Convention and the
Kyoto Protocol, only to find that there is little beyond diplomatic pressure that can be
applied against countries that fail to live up to their commitments. They desire more effec-
tive means to induce countries to live up to their commitments. Trade sanctions are an
obvious choice. One international organization that can legitimately impose trade sanctions
is the WTO. Thus, while some of the demonstrators in Seattle were railing against the
WTO and calling for its demise, major environmental NGOs were demanding a seat at the
WTO table. They were asking for direct input into the negotiation process. While the
NGOs were not directly successful in their attempts, the WTO is giving considerable
thought to how civil society can be accommodated in the organization’s deliberations. The
WTO, with its ability to impose trade sanctions, is a coveted prize that may be open to cap-
ture. The capture of international organizations is not unprecedented—the International
Whaling Commission, which is supposed to manage commercial whaling activities, has
effectively been captured by those with an interest in having commercial whaling banned.
The WTO is simply a more desirable target.
While the potential capture of the WTO by environmental and other civil society
groups may seem far-fetched, it is not without precedent, as illustrated by the case of intel-
lectual property protection. The proportion of the value of goods comprised of intellectual
property has been increasing steadily over the past two decades. Further, the ability to pro-
duce intellectual property is clearly seen as a major determinant of economic growth and
of relative economic performance internationally. To maintain their leadership in the glob-
al economy, countries must be on the leading edge of technological development. Piracy
of intellectual property reduces the incentive for firms to invest in its development and,
thus, threatens countries’long-term economic performance.
Prior to the Uruguay Round the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was
the international organization responsible for intellectual property protection. It is similar
to an MEA in that it has no enforcement capability other than the diplomatic pressure that
could be brought to bear. Many developing countries did not belong to WIPO. Those with
a vested interest in protection of intellectual property, largely firms and governments in
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intellectual property. The instrument chosen was the GATT. The Uruguay Round negotia-
tions produced the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
which established standards of intellectual property protection for its members. Further, the
negotiations led to the agreement to establish the WTO to administer the TRIPS as well as
the GATT. A central element of the WTO was that it would administer one dispute settle-
ment system covering both agreements.3 A major reason for this unified dispute system,
and for that matter the structure of the WTO, is to allow for cross-agreement retaliation.
This means that countries can impose trade restrictions (through the GATT) on imports of
goods from countries that fail to live up to their commitments to protect intellectual prop-
erty in the TRIPS. Further, to belong to the WTO and receive the benefits of the GATT, all
countries had to agree to sign the TRIPS. Thus, those with a vested interest in the protec-
tion of intellectual property were successful in obtaining trade sanctions as a legitimate
international policing mechanism. In essence, they were able to capture the GATT and
reconstitute it to help achieve their goals. There was a period of grace allowed for devel-
oping countries to put TRIPS compliant intellectual property regimes in place, but that has
now expired and the United States has recently served notice that it intends to bring TRIPS
cases forward to the WTO’s dispute settlement system.
The protection of intellectual property is not an international trade issue despite the
phrase “Trade-Related Aspects” being embedded in the TRIPS’ title. International move-
ments of counterfeit goods could easily be handled without the TRIPS. The inclusion of the
TRIPS in the WTO clearly moved the GATT, which was primarily an organization that
made rules for trade, into an international policing role. Trade barriers can now be imposed
on imports from countries that do not live up to their TRIPS commitments. The barriers
will be put in place on products at the discretion of the importing country. This increases
the risks associated with investing in international commercial activities—contrary to the
intent of the original GATT.4
It is probably not surprising that groups in civil society see the WTO as a prize that is
open to capture. They have a precedent to follow. Relative to the GATT, with its consen-
sus-based dispute settlement system, the WTO is a more desirable target because it has a
relatively automatic dispute settlement system that can be used to threaten countries with
trade sanctions. It was designed that way.
It would no doubt be very difficult to remove the TRIPS from the WTO and return the
organization to its role of being exclusively concerned with commercial policy. This could
only be done through a more general initiative to deal with the issue of the sanctioning role
of trade barriers. Afirst step would be to deal with the question of defining the relationship
between MEAs and the WTO. While the WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment
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tions—nor should it. It serves no good purpose for the WTO to become mired in questions
relating to the sanctioning of countries that do not practice “good” environmental manage-
ment, or, for that matter, enforce “good” labour standards or “good” animal welfare proce-
dures. The WTO has consistently stated that it does not have the competence to deal with
these issues. Without a clear separation of the sanctioning role of trade restrictions from the
commercial rules of trade, the WTO will be drawn into what are essentially political con-
flicts. One of the major irritants for environmental groups is the dismissal by the WTO dis-
pute settlement system of U.S. trade sanctions imposed for marine mammal management
reasons on a technicality. The WTO ruled that trade sanctions cannot be imposed for rea-
sons to do with the processes used in production, and fishing methods are processes. The
process rule has a good commercial reason for being incorporated in the WTO—to prevent
countries from raising trade barriers in cases where foreign firms use a different (and more
efficient) technology. It was not intended to control the use of trade sanctions imposed for
environmental reasons.
New Groups Desiring Protection
I
f the WTO could be disentangled from the trade sanction issue, there are a number of
issues it should deal with. When the GATT was established, only one group was per-
ceived as asking for protection—producers. The entire GATT system was premised on lim-
iting governments’ability to extend protection to producers. It seems increasingly evident
that other groups are asking for protection from imports. Consumers and environmental
groups both lobby forcefully for protection. This has been most evident recently over the
issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Kerr, 1999; Perdikis, 2000). It is show-
ing up increasingly in issues that the WTO is being asked to deal with—eco-labelling, ani-
mal welfare, beef produced using growth hormones, child labour, dolphin-friendly tuna,
leghold traps, etc. These issues should not be confused with trade sanctioning although
they may be parts of the same problem. Environmentalists wishing to be informed as to the
fishing practices used to catch imported tuna, or even asking that tuna fished according to
certain methods be excluded from their market, is different from using trade sanctions to
threaten countries into adopting and enforcing new environmental regulations. Similarly,
consumers wishing to be informed of the animal welfare standards (a production process)
used to produce imported meat products is different from asking for trade sanctions to force
countries to increase their standards. The former must be dealt with by the WTO, as it is
an issue of protection (Perdikis and Kerr, 1999). The Uruguay Round agreements on
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade were negoti-
ated from the traditional GATT perspective that only producers would ask for protection.
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protection to producers through the use of arbitrary or overly demanding health or sanitary
regulations. It is not, however, appropriate to deal with consumer concerns. This is illus-
trated by the EU’s unsuccessful attempt to use the SPS to justify the exclusion from its mar-
ket of beef produced using hormones. Consumers’nonacceptance of the scientific evidence
relating to the safety of beef produced using hormones make this a consumer issue in the
EU (Kerr and Hobbs, 2000). Dealing with consumers, environmentalists and others in the
civil society who may be demanding protection from their politicians is a major challenge
for the WTO. It is made all the more difficult because these issues are often also areas
where the use of sanctions is raised as a possibility. Until the WTO can set itself apart from
the sanctioning role of trade restrictions, it will be difficult to make progress on these
important commercial trade issues.
C o n c l u s i o n
T
he Uruguay Round made a number of overdue improvements to the GATT that
changed it from the  “club” model that may have been appropriate to the early years
of its existence to that of a modern organization that more closely reflects the current polit-
ical and commercial reality. In the process, however, through the inclusion of the TRIPS
and cross-agreement retaliation in the dispute settlement system, the WTO was given a
mandate to use trade barriers in a sanctioning role. Including sanctions for violations of
intellectual property within the WTO’s mandate has altered fundamentally the nature of the
new organization and has made it a target for others with an interest in trade sanctions.
Ironically, giving the WTO an effective dispute settlement mechanism has increased its
desirability as an institution to be captured. While there may be good reasons for changing
the nature of GATT during its metamorphosis into the WTO, the outcome runs counter to
the basic intent of the GATT—to reduce the risks associated with governments imposing
trade sanctions for firms wishing to invest in international commercial activities. It is
unlikely that this was intended. Hence, in the post-Seattle interlude, it may be wise to
rethink the WTO.
E n d n o t e s
1.   Of course, state trading agencies exist and are important for organizing international
transactions in some countries.
2.   Trade sanctions, however, may not be particularly effective. See Kerr and Gaisford
(1994) for a discussion of the efficacy of trade sanctions.
3.   The WTO also administers the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
which also comes under its unified dispute system.
4.   The efficacy of imposing trade sanctions on developing country governments for
TRIPS violations has, however, been questioned (Yampoin and Kerr, 1998).  
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